Quitting Qatar is the least of Hamas’s problems

The spacious beige villas in Doha’s northern suburbs were once home to many of the senior leaders of Hamas, the Palestinian Islamists. But they have largely been empty in recent months. Since the last round of American- and Qatari-mediated talks with Israel collapsed in August, the Qataris, once welcoming, have cooled on Hamas. The group’s remaining bosses have been spending more time in Turkey, where Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government has received them more warmly.

Qatari officials say recent reports that they are planning to evict Hamas are “inaccurate”, but sources close to the group’s leaders concede that with a new American president, they may not be able to keep their political headquarters there much longer. “We are just being prudent,” says the son of a member of the group’s politburo of their sojourns in Istanbul.

After the attacks of October 7th, Hamas looked triumphant. Today its base in Gaza has been destroyed, its leadership decapitated and it seems increasingly homeless. Even as the war grinds on, more Gazans are willing to speak out against the Islamists, blaming them for unleashing Israel’s anger and its devastating war. Anti-Hamas protests were rare before the conflict; they have become a bit more common. Salman al-Dayah, a leading Islamic scholar in Gaza, recently published a coruscating fatwa accusing Hamas of “violating Islamic principles” when it endangered its own civilians by attacking Israel.

Over the past ten months Hamas has lost its three most prominent figures: its chief in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, and its senior political leaders, Ismail Haniyeh and Saleh al-Arouri. The group is now led by a quartet of squabbling officials based outside Gaza, who are keeping a low profile for fear of assassination, and the remnants of the military wing’s commanders in Gaza.

Its two main patrons now view it as a liability more than an asset. Iran sees Hamas as having dragged it and its proxy, Hizbullah, into an unending cycle of warfare with Israel. The Qataris still give the group a platform on Al Jazeera, a state-sponsored satellite channel. But they are coming under growing pressure from the Americans to show that they still wield influence over Hamas, or to kick it out (Qatar also hosts major American bases).

Throughout most of the war, a ceasefire in Gaza was seen as the key to bringing some kind of peace to the region. That has changed. American-brokered talks for a deal in Lebanon are now more advanced. Iran is also anxious to find a way to prevent more Israeli air strikes which jeopardise its economy and internal stability. If these aims can be achieved, Hamas could be left out in the cold.

Hamas maintains that it will agree to a ceasefire and release the remaining 101 Israeli hostages (half of whom are presumed dead) only when Israel commits to a full withdrawal from Gaza. This is looking increasingly unlikely. Israeli forces have expanded their hold on three widening strips of territory, and are pushing most of the population into a “humanitarian zone” in the south, where most will spend a second awful winter in tents. And Israel’s leaders are unlikely to make any concessions until after Donald Trump’s inauguration.

If Hamas refuses to show any flexibility in negotiations and is evicted from Qatar, it will be left with few alternatives. Decamping to Tehran would increase its dependence on Iran. Iraq, another majority-Shia country, might be an uncomfortable base for the Sunnis of Hamas. Damascus and Beirut are within easy reach of Israel’s security services, which have vowed to hunt down those responsible for the October 7th massacres. Turkey may be the only option, but even Mr Erdogan, as the leader of a member of nato, has to keep up appearances. “There won’t be a brass plate on the door,” says one Western official in Doha. Surveillance will be far more “robust”.

Abandoned by its allies, resented by Gazans and still under attack from Israel, losing its comfortable outpost in Doha may be the least of Hamas’s problems.

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